Summits between American and Chinese leaders are always carefully watched 
for the visual optics and painstakingly scrutinized by analysts for specific 
policy content and implications for the future. The May 14-15 state visit 
by President Donald Trump and summit in Beijing with Chinese Communist Party 
General Secretary and President Xi Jinping is no different. In this instance,
 three principal questions arise: what happened, what didn't happen, and 
what can be anticipated for the future?

What Happened at the Summit

The photographic optics were key to the two sides' main intended goals of 
the summit: to project normality and stability in the relationship. The 
carefully choreographed “photo-ops” were intended to capture a combination 
of formality and informality.

On the formal side, the images included the two leaders reviewing the PLA 
honor guard in front of the Great Hall of the People, discussion/negotiation 
sessions between the two government delegations across a long table inside 
the Great Hall, and a state dinner also in the cavernous 1959 building complex.
 On the informal side, the two presidents toured the grounds of the 15th 
century Temple of Heaven, and President Xi welcomed President Trump inside 
the Zhongnanhai leadership compound next to the Forbidden City (a rarity 
for foreign visitors) where they casually strolled among the trees and gardens 
and were also were photographed having one-on-one discussions in a reception 
hall.

President Trump's entourage also figured prominently in some photographs, 
notably the technology titans Elon Musk (Tesla and SpaceX), Tim Cook (Apple),
 and Jensen Huang (Nvidia). Other notable financial industry leaders included 
the heads of Blackstone, Goldman Sachs, BlackRock, Citicorp, and Blackstone. 
On the government side, Trump brought along three cabinet secretaries: Secretary 
of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and Secretary of 
Treasury Scott Bessent (this is the first time I can recall these three 
most senior cabinet officials ever accompanying an American president to 
China). For its part, Xi Jinping's delegation was equally senior and included 
Premier Li Qiang, Vice Premier He Lifeng, Politburo member Cai Qi, State 
Councilor Wang Yi, Secretary of Commerce Wang Wentao, and Defense Minister 
Dong Jun.

We can expect each set of government interlocutors to now establish more 
regularized communications and meetings (including in the defense sphere)─
but there will be no return to the over-institutionalized and unwieldy bilateral 
counterpart dialogues (which ballooned to 98 during the Obama years before 
the first Trump administration reduced them to a handful of fewer than five, 
a practice followed during the Biden administration). The two sides did 
agree to establish two new bureaucratic mechanisms: a Board of Trade (to 
negotiate tariffs and other trade-related goals on specific “non-sensitive 
goods”) and a Board of Investment (a forum to discuss each sides' investment 
concerns and opportunities in the other country, also in areas not related 
to national security).

Optics sometimes convey substance in diplomacy (sometimes not). In this 
instance, they illustrated the most important outcome of the summit: the 
stabilization of relations following a very volatile first year of the second 
Trump administration, after eight years of escalating strains during Trump 
1.0, and fluctuant but stressed ties during the Biden administration. Both 
leaders sought to portray a new tenor in the relationship, although obviously 
there remain many underlying difficulties and competitive elements. Viewed 
from the perspective of international relations theory this is a classic 
example of the “agent-structure” paradigm: the degree to which individual 
leaders can have a defining influence on state-to-state relations and can 
overcome structural/systemic constraints in bilateral relations and the 
global environment.

The new zeitgeist that Xi and Trump have sought to establish is perhaps 
best illustrated by the new phrase they agreed to describe the relationship: 
a “constructive U.S.-China relationship of strategic stability” (建设性
的中美关系战略稳定). While not unimportant for the American side, for the 
Chinese side such phrases are extremely meaningful─because they constitute 
a tifa (提法) which is a framing narrative from which a variety of specific 
policies derive. This is not the first time that the two sides have agreed 
such a narrative phrase to characterize the trajectory of relations, most 
recently when in 2013 Xi Jinping announced (and President Obama seemed to 
agree to) a “new type of major power relations” (新型大国关系). However, 
this is the first time in a joint U.S.-China agreement that the three individual 
adjectives and nouns “constructive,” “strategic,” and “stability” 
have been used.

Indeed, it was particularly stability (stabilization) that was the principal 
goal of the summit. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi elaborated after the summit, 
“It should be healthy stability where competition is kept within proper 
limits and is not turned into a zero-sum game.” Wang Yi's use of the term 
“competition” is also a significant admission and concession, as the Chinese 
side has been highly reluctant to even use the term─but in his May 17 media 
briefing Foreign Minister Wang elaborated at some length about how competition 
could serve as a positive spur for each country and mutual improvement, rather 
than as a strategy to counter the other. However, Wang did not discuss or 
define what was meant by “strategic” (战略). For Americans, that term 
usually refers to the military and security affairs while “strategic stability”
 usually refers to the nuclear weapons balance. Some other Chinese commentators 
subsequently equated “strategic” with “comprehensive all-around relations.
”

What Didn't Happen at the Summit?

Beyond photo-ops and the language used, the summit actually achieved a limited 
number of concrete outcomes. The lack of tangible outcomes may have reflected 
the lack of pre-summit preparations, as the White House was known to have 
been unfocussed, unprepared, and disengaged in the months and weeks leading 
up to the summit (to the great frustration of the Chinese side which always 
seeks intensive pre-planning and meticulous scripting of such meetings). 
There was no mutually agreed communique (also likely reflecting the lack 
of pre-summit preparation and agreements on “deliverables”).

One limited achievement was to reinvigorate people-to-people exchanges, 
especially of students (which have significantly atrophied in recent years). 
Xi Jinping reiterated his November 2024 invitation for 50,000 American students 
to come to China over a five-year period (currently there are only a paltry 
1200). Hopefully, the Chinese side will also significantly open-up to American 
scholars who seek to do field research in Chinese society, archives, libraries,
 and other venues (as Chinese scholars are routinely able to do in the United 
States).

Concerning trade, the two sides discussed increasing Chinese purchases in 
several sectors (notably in agriculture and aviation) although individual 
deals and specific numbers of purchases were not given and there were some 
discrepancies between the two government readouts.

Iran was also discussed─but, again, no specifics were given. What was said 
was that the two sides agreed that the Strait of Hormuz “should remain 
open to the free flow of energy” and no tolls should be charged by Iran 
or any other actor.

According to the Chinese post-summit readout the two presidents also exchanged 
views on “the Middle East situation, the Ukraine crisis, and the Korean 
Peninsula.” Interestingly, a post-summit “fact sheet” issued by the White 
House (but not stated by the Chinese side) said that “President Trump and 
President Xi confirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea”─
if so, this would be the first time in a long time that either government 
has restated this older mutual goal and it would indicate that neither accepts 
the DPRK's substantial nuclear arsenal (now an estimated 40-60 nuclear warheads)
 as a fait accompli.

Artificial intelligence, fentanyl, and military-military relations were 
also apparently discussed between the two sides (but not necessarily the 
two leaders). Again, specific commitments concerning these topics were illusive.


Clearly, the most sensitive and important issue discussed concerned Taiwan. 
President Xi laid down an unmistakably strong marker in his opening meeting 
when he warned President Trump: “If handled poorly, the two countries could 
collide or even enter into conflict, pushing the entire China-U.S. relationship 
into an extremely dangerous place.” Xi also reiterated China's longstanding 
position that the Taiwan issue is “the most important issue” in U.S.-China 
relations and the most important of China's “core interests.” Xi also 
directly asked Trump if he “planned to militarily intervene in Taiwan,”
 to which Trump apparently was non-committal (thus upholding the longstanding 
American policy of “strategic ambiguity”).

Xi also pressed Trump specifically on the $14 billion arms sales package 
for Taiwan (which Trump had held up as an olive branch prior to the summit). 
Again, apparently Trump was non-committal─but on the flight back to the 
United States aboard Air Force One he told journalists: “I'll make a determination 
over the next fairly short period,” adding that “I have to speak to the 
person that right now, as you know─you know who he is─that's running Taiwan.
” That would be Lai Ching-te, and it would be highly provocative to Beijing 
and a violation of decades of non-contact between the U.S. and Taiwanese 
leaders (in 2017 Trump did break this taboo by receiving a congratulatory 
phone call from Tsai Ing-wen).

By Trump's directly discussing arms sales to Taiwan with Xi was a violation 
of the so-called “Six Assurances” given to Taiwan in 1982, which held, 
among other things, that the U.S. side would never discuss or negotiate 
arms sales and defense assistance with the PRC government. While in Beijing, 
Trump also shockingly told Fox News in an on-camera interview, with respect 
to arms sales to Taiwan: “It's a very good negotiating chip for us, frankly.
 It's a lot of weapons.” This implied linkage of Taiwan arms sales to other 
issues in the broader U.S.-China bilateral relationship is also unprecedented.
 The net effects of Trump's discussions with Xi and statements concerning 
Taiwan arms sales are major departures from decades of disciplined official 
American positions and only confirm Taipei's worst fears prior to the summit.

What About the Future?

The two heads-of-state will meet again three more times this year: Xi accepted 
Trump's invitation for a reciprocal state visit to Washington on September 
24, on November 18-19 when China hosts APEC in Shenzhen, and on December 
14-15 when the United States is the host of the G-20 economic summit in 
Miami. Simply having this roadmap ahead, with the Beijing summit behind 
them, adds further continuity and stability to the U.S.-China relationship. 
Let's see if it lasts.

解析「习特会」成果

沈大伟教授 美国乔治华盛顿大学

中美领导人峰会向来备受瞩目，外界既关注会晤的视觉呈现效果，分析人士也会对
其具体政策内涵及对未来的影响进行细致入微的审视。唐纳德•特朗普总统5月14日
至15日对中国进行的国事访问、以及与中共中央总书记、国家主席习近平举行的峰
会也不例外。如此，会晤便有三个核心问题：达成了什么，未达成什么，以及未来
可以期待什么？

峰会达成了什么

此次峰会的影像呈现是双方实现会晤主要目标的关键：展现两国关系的常态与稳定。
精心设计的“合影环节”旨在捕捉并展现出一种正式与非正式兼具的氛围。

在正式场合，影像画面包括两位领导人在人民大会堂前检阅中国人民解放军仪仗队、
双方政府代表团在人民大会堂内隔着长桌举行会谈/磋商，以及在这座建于1959年的
宏伟建筑群内举行的国宴。在非正式场合，两国元首游览了建于15世纪的天坛公园，
习近平主席还在紧邻故宫的中南海领导人办公区接待特朗普总统（外国访客鲜有机
会进入），二人在林木掩映的园林中漫步，并被拍到在一处会客厅进行了一对一的
交谈。

特朗普总统的随行人员在一些照片中也占据显著位置，尤其是科技巨头埃隆•马斯
克（特斯拉和SpaceX）、蒂姆•库克（苹果）和黄仁勋（英伟达）。其他还有金融
界知名领袖，包括贝莱德、高盛、花旗和黑石的负责人。政府方面，特朗普带来三
位内阁部长：国务卿马尔科•鲁比奥、国防部长皮特•赫格塞思、财政部长斯科特
•贝森特（我印象中，这是美国三位最高级别内阁官员首次一起陪同总统访华）。
中方这边，习主席的代表团同样级别极高，成员包括国务院总理李强、副总理何立
峰、中央政治局委员蔡奇、国务委员王毅、商务部长王文涛以及国防部长董军。

可以预见，两国政府对接团队今后将建立更为常态化的沟通与会晤机制（包括防务
领域），但以往那种过度建制化、运转低效的双边对口磋商机制不会重现（奥巴马
时期此类机制曾膨胀至98个，特朗普首届政府将其精简至不到5个，拜登政府延续了
这一做法）。双方已同意建立两个新的官方机制：贸易委员会（就特定“非敏感商
品”的关税及相关贸易目标进行磋商）和投资委员会（为讨论双方在对方国家的投
资关切与机遇提供平台，同样仅限于不涉及国家安全的领域）。

外交场合的表象有时能反映实质（有时则不然），而此次会晤的画面彰显出峰会最
核心的成果：两国关系经过特朗普首任八年的紧张升级、拜登政府时期的动荡紧绷，
以及特朗普第二任期首年的剧烈震荡后，终于趋于稳定。尽管仍存在诸多深层矛盾
与竞争因素，但两国领导人都力求塑造双边关系的全新基调。从国际关系理论视角
来看，这是“施动者-结构”范式的典型案例，它体现了个人领袖能在多大程度上对
国家间关系产生决定性影响，并克服双边关系及全球环境中的结构性/系统性制约。


习特二人力图确立的这种新的时代氛围，或许最集中体现在双方为定义两国关系达
成的新表述上──“中美建设性战略稳定关系”。这一表述对美方而言固然重要，
但对中方则具有特殊深意，因为它构成一种“提法”，即一个框架性叙事，诸多具
体政策都将由此衍生。双方协商确定此类概括关系走向的表述并非首次，最近一次
可追溯至2013年习近平主席提出（奥巴马总统当时似也认同）的“新型大国关系”。
不过，在中美联合文件中同时组合使用“建设性”“战略”“稳定”这三个形容词
与名词尚属首次。

事实上，稳定（局势企稳）正是此次峰会的核心目标。正如王毅外长在会后阐释的
那样：“这应该是竞争有度的良性稳定，不搞你输我赢的零和博弈。”王毅使用
“竞争”一词，本身就是一次重要的表态与让步，因为中方此前一直不愿使用这一
术语。在5月17日的媒体吹风会上，王毅外长用了相当长的篇幅来阐述竞争应如何成
为推动两国各自进步和共同提升的积极动力，而不是一种针对对方的对抗策略。不
过，王毅并未解释或界定“战略”的含义。对美方而言，该词通常指向军事与安全
事务，“战略稳定”多指核力量平衡。而中国部分评论人士后来将“战略” 解读为
“全面、全方位的关系”。

峰会未达成什么

抛开合影造势与措辞表述不谈，此次峰会取得的实质性成果不多。成果有限，究其
原因在于会前筹备不足。峰会召开前数周乃至数月，美方态度散漫、准备欠缺、疏
于对接（一贯主张周密筹备、细致预案的中方对此颇为不满）。双方并未联合发布
公报（也从侧面说明峰会前缺乏充分准备，以及未能就“实质性成果”达成共识）。


为数不多的有限成果之一，是重启人文交流，尤其是学生往来（近年已大幅萎缩）。
习近平主席重申2023年11月发出的邀请：未来五年邀请五万名美国学生来华（目前
仅有约1200人）。期待中方也能大幅放宽对美国学者的限制，让他们在中国社会、
档案馆、图书馆等场所做实地研究（正如中国学者在美国通常进行的那样）。

在贸易方面，双方讨论了增加中国在若干领域（特别是农业和航空领域）的采购，
但未公布具体交易事项与采购数额，且两国政府发布的情况说明也有不一致之处。

双方还讨论了伊朗问题，但同样未透露具体细节。已公布的内容是，双方同意霍尔
木兹海峡“应保持开放，确保能源运输自由”，且伊朗及其他各方均不应收取通行
费。

根据中方会后通报，两国元首还就“中东局势、乌克兰危机和朝鲜半岛问题”交换
了意见。值得注意的是，白宫会后发布的 “情况说明”（但中方未提及）称，特朗
普总统与习近平主席确认了朝鲜无核化的共同目标。若属实，这将是两国政府时隔
许久再次重申这一既有共识，也表明双方均不接受朝鲜拥有庞大核武库（估计现有
40至60枚核弹头）为既定事实。

双方显然也讨论了人工智能、芬太尼以及两军关系等议题（但未必由两位领导人直
接进行）。各方均未就此作出明确具体承诺。

显而易见，讨论中最敏感、最重要的议题是台湾。习近平主席在会谈开场即明确划
出强硬红线，他警告特朗普总统：“处理不好，两国就会碰撞甚至冲突，将整个中
美关系推向十分危险的境地。”他重申了中方的一贯立场，即台湾问题是中美关系
中“最重要的问题”，也是中国“核心利益中的核心”。他还直接询问特朗普是否
“计划军事介入台湾”，特朗普显然未做承诺（从而维持了美国长期奉行的“战略
模糊”政策）。

习近平还专门就价值140亿美元的对台军售计划向特朗普施压（为了示好，特朗普峰
会前特意暂缓推进）。显然特朗普对此也未做承诺。在搭乘“空军一号”返程途中，
他向记者表示“会在短期内做出最终决定”，并称“我需要和当下执掌台湾的那个
人──你们知道他是谁──沟通”。他指的是赖清德，此举会严重挑衅北京，违背
美台领导人数十年来互不接触的惯例（2017年特朗普就曾打破惯例接听蔡英文的祝
贺电话）。

特朗普与习近平直接讨论对台军售，违反了美国1982年对台湾的所谓“六项保证”，
其中明确规定美方不得与中华人民共和国政府讨论或谈判军售及防务援助事宜。在
北京期间，特朗普面对镜头接受福克斯新闻采访时，也令人震惊地谈及对台军售：
“坦白说，这是我们非常好的谈判筹码。那可是一大批武器。”将对台军售与中美
双边其他议题挂钩，这也是前所未有的。特朗普与习近平的讨论以及他有关对台军
售的表态，大大背离了几十年来美国一贯谨慎的官方立场，只会坐实台北在峰会前
最深的担忧。

未来会怎样

两国元首今年还有三次会面机会：习近平已接受特朗普的国事访问邀请，将于9月24日
回访华盛顿；11月18日至19日中国将在深圳主办APEC会议；12月14日至15日美国将
在迈阿密主办G20经济峰会。北京峰会之后，双方已规划出未来路线图，这将为中美
关系增添更多延续性和稳定性。且看这种态势能否持续吧。

(The source of the article comes from  chinausfocus.com)