(June 22 , 2026)

Since last autumn, China-U.S. relations have gradually moved toward stabilization,
 with a nascent momentum of constructive engagement emerging. Against this 
backdrop, U.S. President Donald Trump paid a state visit to China from May 
this year, marking the first state visit by a U.S. president to China in 
nine years.

During the visit, the two heads of state and their teams held extensive, 
candid, in-depth strategic consultations on the global situation and China-U.
S. relations. The two sides reached an important consensus on building a 
constructive bilateral relationship of strategic stability, and they agreed 
to expand exchanges and cooperation across a wide range of fields, including 
diplomacy, defense, trade, public health, agriculture, tourism, people-to-people 
exchanges and law enforcement.

In September, Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to pay a state visit 
to the United States at the invitation of Washington. Toward the end of 
the year, as the APEC and G20 summits are held in the two countries, the 
two heads of state are expected to meet again on the sidelines.

At a pivotal moment marked by shifts in the global landscape and the respective 
development trajectories of both countries, emerging changes and new dynamics 
in China-U.S. relations are expected to produce a positive and significant 
impact on the overall bilateral relationship, strategic nuclear relations 
and the broader regional strategic environment.

First, unlike the characterization of a “relationship of strategic competition,
” which generated serious friction and even confrontation between the two 
countries in the past, the new formulation of a “constructive relationship 
of strategic stability” is intended to promote the positive, healthy and 
sustained development of the overall relationship. It encompasses all major 
dimensions of bilateral relations, including the countries' strategic nuclear 
relationship. However, it should be noted that this strategic nuclear relationship 
is not identical to traditional nuclear strategic stability. The two should 
not be conflated.

Second, as two-way diplomatic and military-to-military dialogues resume 
and are strengthened, exchanges in areas related to nuclear strategic stability 
are expected to gradually advance. These may include the resumption of the 
China-U.S. Arms Control and Nonproliferation Consultations, the restoration 
and strengthening of bilateral crisis management mechanisms and dialogue 
channels and the enhancement of confidence-building measures.In addition, 
the two sides may explore and initiate dialogue on the military applications 
of artificial intelligence, on cybersecurity and on space security. Such 
exchanges are expected to have a positive and important impact on maintaining 
strategic stability.

Third, in the field of strategic security, Track II dialogues are expected 
to receive greater support and more guidance from authorities on both sides. 
Track 1.5 dialogues may also be resumed in the near future. Advancing such 
dialogues is of crucial importance, as they can serve as a useful platform 
and lay the groundwork for the restoration and strengthening of official 
Track I strategic security dialogues.

Fourth, the sustained and stable development of China-U.S. relations is 
also expected to contribute to greater stability in the strategic security 
environment in East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Over a prolonged 
period, the deterioration of the relationship has placed many countries 
in the region─most of which prefer not to take sides in great-power competition─
in an increasingly difficult position. This situation may see some improvement 
going forward. Cooperation between China and its neighboring countries is 
likely to be strengthened, and regional multilateral dialogues may gain additional 
vitality and space.At the same time, relations between U.S. allies in the 
region and China may also experience some degree of improvement. Collectively,
 these developments could help to curb the momentum of nuclear proliferation.

However, while acknowledging the positive implications of all this, it is 
also necessary to recognize that the extent of stabilization and improvement 
in China-U.S. relations remain limited. To achieve a constructive relationship 
of strategic stability characterized by cooperation as the mainstay, competition 
within proper limits, manageable differences and an expectation of peace, 
both sides will need to overcome a wide range of obstacles and commit to 
sustained, long-term and demanding efforts.

First, China and the United States continue to suffer from a serious deficit 
of mutual trust, and the significant uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration'
s policies is likely to become a major obstacle to the implementation of 
the existing consensus. In addition, whether the administration will become 
a lame duck after the midterm elections is also a key concern for the Chinese 
side.To address this severe trust deficit, the top priority for both sides 
should be to translate the consensus reached by the two heads of state into 
concrete actions as soon as possible.

Second, government officials on both sides, particularly military personnel, 
may lack sufficient experience in conducting bilateral engagements and confidence 
in achieving meaningful progress through dialogue, because many dialogue 
and exchange mechanisms have been suspended for years. Beyond economic and 
financial dialogues, whether the two sides can effectively restore and strengthen 
exchanges across various fields in the coming months, especially military-to-
military dialogue, will serve as an important test of their ability to implement 
the consensus reached by their leaders.

Third, during the China-U.S. summit, the Chinese side placed particular 
emphasis on the Taiwan question and reiterated its consistent position. 
But Trump made no explicit commitments on this issue. In a news briefing, 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China felt the U.S. side “understands 
China's position, attached importance to China's concerns and does not approve 
or support Taiwan independence.” Yet in remarks made after leaving China, 
Trump sent seemingly contradictory signals. He indicated that he did not 
wish to see Taiwan independence and that he would not send troops to engage 
in conflict across the Taiwan Strait, but he later suggested that he might 
speak with Lai Ching-te regarding issues related to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Looking ahead, whether the United States will uphold the “one China” policy 
as articulated in the three Joint Communiques, exercise extreme caution 
in handling the Taiwan question and avoid crossing China's red lines will 
be a key factor in determining whether or not meaningful progress can be 
made toward a constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.

Fourth, for a long period of time, the U.S. has expressed strong interest 
in establishing a dialogue on strategic stability with China in the nuclear 
domain. However, serious differences persist between the two sides regarding 
the definition and content of strategic stability, including key issues 
such as nuclear policies and transparency. Conditions are not yet mature 
for launching such a dialogue in the near term. The proposal repeatedly raised 
by Trump for a trilateral nuclear dialogue of the United States, Russia, 
and China is even less realistic. Since China's nuclear arsenal is not comparable 
in scale to those of the United States and Russia, the nuclear arms reduction 
process between Washington and Moscow constitutes the primary prerequisite 
for advancing global strategic stability.Against this backdrop, strengthening 
Track II dialogues on China-U.S. strategic nuclear relations, resuming relevant 
Track 1.5 exchanges and conducting intergovernmental dialogues on nuclear 
security should serve as transitional steps toward the formal launch of 
a dialogue on strategic stability. Ensuring that this process begins, rather 
than being indefinitely delayed, will require the assent of both sides.

In sum, over the next two and a half years, China-U.S. relations will face 
both opportunities and challenges. At least this year, and particularly 
given the three forthcoming meetings between the two heads of state, the 
opportunities appear to outweigh the challenges, and relations are expected 
to continue moving forward. This window of opportunity should be seized, 
as doing so can lay a new foundation for elevating the relationship to a 
higher level in the years ahead.

中美关系新变化的重大意义

去年秋季以来，中美关系逐步趋向稳定，开始出现良性互动势头。在此形势下，今
年5月13日至15日，特朗普总统访华。这是美国总统时隔九年再次对中国进行国事访
问。

访问期间，两国元首及双方团队围绕世界形势、中美关系进行了长时间坦诚、深入
的战略沟通，就构建中美建设性战略稳定关系达成重要共识，并决定以此为指导，
在外交、两军、经贸、卫生、农业、旅游、人文、执法等各个领域开展更多交流。

今年9月，习近平主席将应邀对美国进行国事访问。年底，APEC和G20峰会分别在中
美两国举行期间两国元首还将再次会晤。

在世界局势转变及两国各自发展的关键时刻，中美关系出现的新变化、新发展有望
对中美总体关系、中美战略核关系及地区战略态势产生积极、重要的影响。

首先，与曾给两国带来严重摩擦甚至对抗的“战略竞争关系”的定位明显不同，
“中美建设性战略稳定关系”的新定位志在促进两国总体关系积极、健康、持续的
发展。它涉及中美关系各主要领域，当然也涉及两国的战略核关系，但它与传统的
核战略稳定并非同一概念，二者不应混淆。

其次，随着中美外交与两军对话交流的恢复与加强，双方在核战略稳定相关领域的
对话交流有望逐步开展。如重启“中美军控与防扩散磋商”，恢复与加强双边危机
管理机制与对话，加强建立信任措施（CBM），探讨并着手建立AI军事应用对话、网
络安全对话及太空安全对话等。这些对话交流的开展将对维护核领域的中美战略稳
定产生积极、重要的影响。

第三，在战略安全领域，二轨对话有望得到双方政府相关部门更大的支持与更多的
指导，一点五轨对话也有望早日重启。这些对话先行一步至关重要，可为政府间一
轨战略安全领域对话的恢复与加强发挥积极探索、准备与铺垫的作用。

第四，中美关系的持续稳定发展还将促进东亚乃至亚太地区战略安全态势的稳定。
在过去较长一段时间里，中美关系的持续恶化使地区内绝大多数不愿在大国竞争中
选边站的国家处境困难，这种情况近期有望有所改变。中国与周边国家的合作将得
到加强，地区多边对话有望获得更多活力与空间，美国大多数地区盟国与中国的关
系可能得到改善，地区核扩散的势头将受到抑制。

然而，在认清上述积极影响的同时也必须看到，中美关系稳定改善的程度仍然有限，
要实现两国关系“合作为主、竞争有度、分歧可控、和平可期”的建设性战略稳定
目标，双方必须克服许多障碍，做出艰苦、长期的努力。两国须共同克服的障碍主
要包括：

首先，中美双方仍严重缺乏互信，而特朗普政府政策的巨大不确定性更可能成为双
方落实共识的严重障碍。此外，美国中期选举后特朗普政府是否会成为跛脚鸭，亦
是中方的一大关切。要使双方互信严重缺失的状况得到改变，尽快将两国元首达成
的共识化为实际行动应是双方的首要努力。

其次，中美诸多对话交流已中断多年，双方政府官员尤其是军队官员严重缺乏开展
双边对话交流的经验及对对话取得积极进展的信心。除经贸、金融对话外，未来几
个月，双方能否切实恢复和加强各领域的对话交流，特别是两军对话交流，将是两
国能否落实元首共识的一项重要检验标准。

第三，在中美元首会晤期间，中方重点提出台湾问题并重申己方一贯严正立场，但
特朗普总统并未就此向中方做出明确承诺。王毅外长答记者问时称，中方在会晤中
感受到“美方了解中方立场，重视中方关切，不认同也不接受台湾走向独立”。但
特朗普总统在离开中国后的答记者问中，却再次发出相互矛盾的信息。他先是提出
不希望有人搞“台独”，不愿派兵远赴台海作战，后又提出会与他（指赖清德）通
话商讨对台军售问题。未来，美国能否坚持三个联合公报中承诺的一中政策，“慎
之又慎”地处理台湾问题，不触及中国设立的红线，将是确保中美建设性战略稳定
关系取得进展的关键。

第四，长期以来，美方一直强烈希望与中方建立核领域战略稳定对话，但到目前为
止，双方在中美战略稳定的定义、内涵以及两国的核政策、透明度等重要问题上仍
存在严重分歧。因此，双方近期开展这一对话的条件仍不成熟。至于特朗普总统多
次提出的美俄中三方核对话，则更不靠谱。中国核武库与美俄核武库远不在一个层
级上，美俄通过核对话带头进行核裁军才是实现全球战略稳定的首要任务。加强中
美战略核关系的二轨对话，恢复相关一点五轨对话，开展政府间某些涉核安全领域
的双边对话，应是中美正式开启战略稳定对话必经的过渡。让这一阶段早点起步，
避免无限延长，需要双方的共同努力。

总之，在接下来的两年多时间里，中美关系的发展既面临机遇也面临挑战。两相比
较，至少在年内，特别是在两国元首近期还将举行三次会晤的情况下，双方面临的
机遇大于挑战，中美关系有望继续向前发展。这个机遇窗口必须牢牢抓住，如此便
可为明后年中美关系更上层楼奠定新的基础。