During the initial weeks of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump 
seemed to highlight two major themes in his foreign policy. One was to assert 
total, flagrant U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The other theme 
was to hint at Washington's willingness to transform the international system 
into a new arrangement that emphasized an outsized role for a handful of 
great powers. Implicitly, that small, select roster of powerful nations 
would exhibit at least a modicum of respect for their respective spheres 
of influence.

Trump was not the least bit subtle about expressing the goal of utter dominance 
for the United States in the Western Hemisphere. A series of his speeches 
made that desire indisputable. Trump's vow to acquire Greenland from Denmark,
 even if he had to put intense pressure on Copenhagen, was a very clear 
signal of intent. His loose talk about the alleged fragility of Canada's 
unity and Washington's receptivity to admitting some provinces as new U.S. 
states was even more revealing. His stated objective to re-take control 
of the Panama Canal and the revival of the threat made during his first term 
" to consider using the U.S. military to combat Mexico's drug cartels "
further underscored that the foundation of his foreign policy would be
hemispheric hegemony.

At the same time that Trump was emphasizing renewed U.S. dominance in its 
geostrategic neighborhood, however, he was reaching out with conciliatory 
messages to other countries that Washington viewed as the principal global 
powers. It was no accident that among the earliest calls from the Oval Office 
were those to Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation, and Xi 
Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Those actions 
hinted at a possible fundamental shift in Washington's overall foreign policy.
 Instead of clinging to the usual strategy of emphasizing close relations 
with traditional U.S. allies in Europe and East Asia, Trump appeared to 
be signaling that he envisions a new system based on a concert of great 
powers and respect for the concept of spheres of influence. The model for 
such an approach would be the system adopted and maintained by Europe's 
great powers from the end of the Napoleonic wars to the onset of World War 
I.

It may be too early to tell if that is what Trump truly has in mind, but 
there are some intriguing signs coming from the administration, and smaller 
U.S. allies in both Europe and East Asia are beginning to hedge their bets 
about the durability of Washington's security guarantees. Officials in Taiwan'
s government are already quietly expressing concerns about the reliability 
of Washington's informal, but strongly implied, commitment to the island's 
security. South Korean leaders appear to harbor similar doubts about the 
solidity of Washington's security shield under the existing bilateral alliance.
 Advocates in South Korea who believe that Seoul should build its own nuclear 
deterrent are again becoming more vocal.

The turbulence in Washington's relations with its NATO allies is even more 
pronounced and public. Trump now demands that NATO's European members increase 
their annual defense spending to a minimum of 5 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP). The president's position is a major escalation from his previous 
demand that the allies all fulfill their earlier promise to devote at least 
2 percent of GDP to defense. However, European leaders, including Ursula 
van der Leyen, the head of the European Commission, seem inclined to accept 
Trump's challenge. She has proposed a Rearm Europe Act that would boost 
European Union (EU) military outlays to $800 billion per yearùnearly as much 
as the projected U.S. budget. In addition, French president Emmanuel Macron 
has stated that he is willing to consider extending France's nuclear deterrent 
to cover his country's European neighbors.

At that point, the EU, plus Britain, would be in position to make Europe 
an independent player in any new concert of great powers. Given the mounting 
policy differences between Washington and its principal European allies, 
Trump does not seem unduly concerned if that development takes place. Indeed,
 a stronger, independent European pillar would be quite consistent with 
a new international order based on cooperation among the handful of truly 
powerful countries.

The presence of the United States, the PRC, Russia, and a resurgent Europe 
would certainly constitute a credible core for such a new concert of great 
powers. However, one major potential impediment would be how to delineate 
spheres of influence, and East Asia might prove to be the most difficult 
arena of all for carrying out that process. For example, how would it be 
possible to draw clear lines of control between Japan and the PRC given their 
close geographic proximity? It also seems rather unlikely that Japan will 
forever be content to be the only major power in the region without nuclear 
weapons. That is especially true if Beijing's already sizable nuclear arsenal 
continues to grow.

The biggest question of all would be what role the United States intends 
(and is able) to play in East Asia in a system based on great power spheres 
of influence. It would be unsustainable for American leaders to insist on 
U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere but not accept the PRC being at 
least the leading power, if not the hegemon, in East Asia. However, reducing 
Washington's demands and expectations in the region would inevitably have 
major real world consequences not only for Japan, South Korea, and other 
countries, but especially for Taiwan. It would be hard to visualize a 
great power peace, if the United States maintains a huge military presence 
in East Asia. That policy would be even harder to sustain if the principal 
purpose is to preserve and defend Taiwan's de facto independence. Beijing 
and Washington must reach a mutually acceptable understanding about Taiwan's 
future status, and that will be an extraordinarily difficult challenge.

The Trump administration's apparent flirtation with the concept of a peace 
based on respect for a handful of great powers and their various spheres 
of influence is mildly encouraging. The age of Pax Americana is fading, 
and it is not clear yet what will replace it. Perceptive experts in international 
affairs understood, though, that change was inevitable someday. Charles 
Krauthammer was wise enough to title his seminal article in Foreign Affairs, 
“The Unipolar Moment,” [emphasis added]. That moment is coming to an end. 
Trump has exhibited some valid instincts about making the needed adjustments, 
but they appear to be little more than instincts yet. A good place to begin 
making the needed reforms more substantive would be to better define the 
respective spheres of influence between the PRC and the United States.

中美必须在新的大国体系内运作

特德•盖伦•卡彭特

(伦道夫•伯恩研究所 (加州)高级研究员)

在第二任期的最初几周，美国总统唐纳德•特朗普似乎强调了其外交政策的两大主
题：一是公然宣称美国在西半球拥有全面霸权，二是暗示华盛顿愿意将国际体系转
变为一种由少数大国发挥主导作用的新安排。不言而喻的是，这些挑选出的大国将
对彼此的势力范围至少表现出一定的尊重。

特朗普毫不掩饰地表达了美国在西半球占据绝对主导地位的目标。他的一系列演讲
都表明这种愿望是不容置疑的。特朗普誓言要从丹麦手中夺取格陵兰岛，即使必须
对哥本哈根施加巨大压力──这非常清楚地表明了他的意图。他随意谈论加拿大统
一的脆弱性以及华盛顿愿意将该国的部分省份纳入美国，就更能说明问题。他声称
要重新控制巴拿马运河，并重提第一任期内发出的威胁，即考虑使用美国军队打击
墨西哥贩毒集团，这进一步体现出他的外交政策基础将是西半球的霸权。

强调美国在地缘战略周边地区重新占据主导地位的同时，特朗普也在向被美国视为
主要全球大国的其他国家发出和解信息。重返白宫后，他最早从椭圆形办公室打出
的电话通向俄罗斯联邦总统弗拉基米尔•普京和中华人民共和国国家主席习近平，
这并非偶然。这些举动暗示华盛顿的整体外交政策可能发生根本性转变。特朗普没
有坚持强调与欧洲和东亚传统盟友建立密切关系的惯常策略，而是似乎在暗示他设
想建立一个以大国协调和尊重势力范围概念为基础的新体系。这种体系的模型是从
拿破仑战争结束到第一次世界大战爆发期间欧洲大国采用和维持的体系。

现在判断特朗普是否真的有此打算还为时过早，但其政府已经发出了一些有趣的信
号。美国在欧洲和东亚的小国盟友也开始对华盛顿提供安全保障的持久性进行权衡。
台湾政府官员悄悄表达出对华盛顿安全承诺可靠性的担忧──这种承诺是非正式的，
也是含蓄的。韩国领导人似乎也怀疑现有双边联盟下美国安全屏障的稳固性。那些
认为韩国应该建立自身核威慑力量的支持者声音日益高涨。

华盛顿与北约盟国关系的动荡更加明显和公开。特朗普如今要求北约的欧洲成员国
将年度国防开支至少增加到国内生产总值的5%，相比他此前要求盟国履行的承诺
（至少GDP的2%）增幅不小。然而，包括欧盟委员会主席乌尔苏拉•范德莱恩在内的
欧洲领导人似乎倾向于接受特朗普的挑战，她提出一项“重新武装欧洲法案”，将
欧盟的军事支出增加到每年8000亿美元，几乎与预估的美国预算相当。此外，法国
总统埃马纽埃尔•马克龙表示，他愿意考虑将法国的核威慑范围扩大到欧洲邻国。

届时，欧盟加上英国将有能力让欧洲在任何新的大国协调中成为独立的参与方。鉴
于华盛顿与其主要欧洲盟友之间的政策分歧日益加深，特朗普似乎并不担心这种情
况的发生。事实上，一个更强大而独立的欧洲与基于少数大国合作的新国际秩序将
非常一致。

美国、中国、俄罗斯和复苏的欧洲无疑将构成这种新的大国协调的可靠核心。然而，
一个主要的潜在障碍是如何划定势力范围，其中，东亚可能是这一过程中最困难的
区域。例如，日本和中国的地理位置接近，如何才能划定两国之间的明确控制线？
日本似乎也不太可能永远满足于成为该地区唯一没有核武器的大国。如果中国本已
相当庞大的核武库继续增长，这种不满情绪将更加明显。

最大的问题在于，在一个以大国势力范围为基础的体系内，美国打算（并且能够）
在东亚扮演什么样的角色。如果美国领导人坚持在西半球的霸权，却不接受中华人
民共和国在东亚至少是主导大国（如果不是霸权的话），那么这种做法是不可持续
的。然而，降低华盛顿在该地区的要求和期望必然会对现实社会产生重大影响，不
仅对日本、韩国和其他国家，对台湾尤其如此。如果美国在东亚保持庞大的军事
存在，就很难想像大国之间能够实现和平。如果主要目的是维护和捍卫台湾事实上
的独立，那么这项政策更难维系。就台湾的未来地位，北京和华盛顿必须达成双方
都能接受的谅解，而这将是一个极其艰巨的挑战。

特朗普政府似乎对基于尊重少数大国及其不同势力范围的和平概念感兴趣，这略微
令人鼓舞。美国治下的和平时代正在消逝，目前尚不清楚什么将取而代之。然而，
敏锐的国际事务专家明白，变化是不可避免的。明智的查尔斯•克劳萨默在《外交
事务》上发表了一篇具有开创性的文章，名为“单极时刻”（着重号是我加上的）。
这一时刻即将结束。特朗普表现出一些做出必要调整的合理直觉，但这些调整似乎
还只是直觉。为了让所需改革更有实质意义，首要工作是更好地界定中国和美国之
间的势力范围。

(The source of the article comes from  chinausfocus.com)