The recent electoral victory of Democratic Progressive Party candidate Lai 
Ching-te in Taiwan's 2024 general election has set many to worrying whether 
Lai, once inaugurated as the island's head of government on May 20, will 
make radical moves toward independence. They worry that the Taiwan Strait 
will become a new flashpoint for conflict and that cross-strait relations 
will turn from under control to out of control " or even collision " with 
the Chinese mainland.
 
For his infamous claim that he is a “pragmatic worker for Taiwan independence,
” Lai has been called an enhanced edition of Lee Teng-hui, an upgraded 
edition of Chen Shui-bian and a radical edition of Tsai Ing-wen.Lai's election 
victory has cast a dark shadow over cross-strait ties, and will have a
tremendous destructive impact on peace and stability.

That is because he is driven, first of all, by the ideology of Taiwan independence.
 Chen Shui-bian was merely a speculative independence seeker ù one who used 
the notion of Taiwan independence as an election tool. But Lai is an open 
and unabashed independence seeker. He never conceals this and, in fact, 
takes pride in it. Tsai, during her tenure, backed independence but without 
saying so, accelerating a so-called “soft” form that featured “cultural 
independence.”Lai will very likely both say and do, not only substantially 
promoting independence but also openly harping on “the myth of Taiwan independence.
” He may even concoct something akin to Lee's “special two states” or 
Chen's “one state on each side” theory.

Second, deep-green forces will take advantage of him. Lai is known as the 
“golden grandson of Taiwan independence,” and deep-green forces on the 
island have high hopes. They believe he can take bigger strides down the 
independence road. If Lai's pro-independence policies are considered to 
be less radical than anticipated, the deep-green forces will certainly launch 
fierce attacks on him, pressing him to make rash moves.

Third, Lai's lame-duck minority government has some practical needs. While 
Lai won the election, it was only by a slight margin, a little more than 
40 percent of the vote. More important, the DPP lost majority control of 
Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, which mean's the new leader is a lame-duck before 
assumes office.Lai will also face various other challenges. As soon as he 
was elected, Nauru announced it would cut off what it had styled as diplomatic 
relations. Many on the island considered this to be a slap in Lai's face. 
Sandwiched between domestic and external troubles, Lai may cozy up to the 
base of the green camp on his own initiative, stage some shows about independence 
and consolidate his constituency to avoid a collapse of his approval ratings.

Internal and external trouble

At the bottom of his heart, Lai wants to walk the same paths toward Taiwan 
independence that Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian had followed, but things 
on both sides of the strait have undergone fundamental changes, subjecting 
Lai to additional constraints and making it impossible for him to recklessly 
pursue his dream. Even Chen had acknowledged the impossibility of independence.
 Lai won't be able to achieve what Chen failed to accomplish.

First, mainstream public opinion in Taiwan strongly opposes independence. 
People on the island want peace, not war; development, not turbulence; happy 
lives, not misery; cross-strait exchanges, not animosity; dialogue, not 
confrontation. If Lai goes too far in seeking independence, there will no 
doubt be great turbulence across the strait, which will inevitably invite 
strong reactions from the island's people.

Second, the United States worries about being dragged into a possible conflict 
with Beijing. Amid all the global turmoil of 2024, there is no sign of the 
Russia-Ukraine conflict coming to an end, and gunfire and bombings persist 
in the Middle East. Under such circumstances, the U.S. does not want the 
Taiwan Strait to become a new flashpoint. America has its hands full already.
But the United States frets that Lai could become a troublemaker as Chen 
Shui-bian was ù so much so that the moment Lai was elected, U.S. President 
Joe Biden openly stated that America doesn't support Taiwan independence. 
The U.S. State Department also restated its commitment to the “one China”
 policy, which was an obvious warning to Lai.

Third, the mainland is resolutely and forcefully opposed to any moves in 
Taiwan toward independence. Compared with the Lee era, the comparative strengths 
of the two sides of the strait have undergone earth-shaking changes, and 
the mainland is more determined and more capable of stopping any separatist 
moves. Should Lai attempt to violate the mainland's bottom line, it will 
definitely end in self-destruction.

A possible orientation

Lai on one hand wants to implement his plan for independence, but on the 
other faces multiple internal and external pressures. So he likely will 
walk a tight rope and try to find a balance.

First, Lai would reject the 1992 Consensus, which he has been denigrating 
for a long time, not to mention never acknowledging that both sides of the 
strait belong to one China. At the beginning of her tenure, Tsai had acknowledged 
the consensus as a historical fact; Lai, however, will be more regressive 
than Tsai and will likely refuse to acknowledge even that much.

Second, he will refuse to forsake Taiwan independence as a plank in the 
party platform. This has long been the DPP's fundamental weakness, as there 
have always been voices within the party to have it frozen as soon as possible.
Meanwhile, the push for independence has sowed a significant potential risk 
for cross-strait peace, which is why (until the recent elections in Taiwan) 
many American scholars had written articles calling on the DPP to abandon 
the idea. Lai has turned a deaf ear despite all such appeals.

Third, Lai may return to the Resolution Regarding Taiwan's Future. The DPP 
passed this measure in 1999, and it has since been enshrined by the party 
as a divine tablet. In 2023, Lai and some people on his campaign team on 
multiple occasions trumpeted the resolution's value. In the future, Lai 
will likely handle cross-strait ties in accordance with that document.

Conclusion

Taiwan now stands at the crossroads of war and peace. It is deemed by many 
to be the most dangerous place in the world. Lai's policy on cross-strait 
relations will be a major variable for the island going forward. If Lai 
believes that Beijing cannot or will not do much about whatever he does 
ù even if he rashly pursues independence ù war might be unavoidable. But 
if he can make timely adjustments, there may be a turn for the better.

Lai's attitude on the campaign trail had been radical. But he seems to have 
made an adjustment after his election victory, as he has said he wants to 
“preserve the status quo.” There still is a window of time before Lai's 
inauguration in May. During this period, he should listen to public opinion 
and make fundamental changes to his rhetoric for the well-being of the 23 
million people of Taiwan. This is the only way for him to maneuver a good 
beginning for his governance and to bring new opportunities for socioeconomic 
progress.

January 23 , 2024

                            赖清德当选可能的后果
                                    钟厚涛

2024年台湾地区领导人选举已经结束，民进党籍候选人赖清德胜出。目前，岛内外
高度忧心，5月20日赖清德上台后会不会大搞激进“台独”？台海地区是否会成为全
球新的闪爆点？两岸关系是否会由可控走向失控甚至滑向“对撞”？

赖清德“暴冲”可能性不容低估

赖清德长期标榜“台独务实工作者”身份，被称为“加强版李登辉”、“升级版陈
水扁”和“冒进版蔡英文”。赖清德胜选，给两岸关系投下严重阴影，对台海地区
和平与稳定将产生巨大破坏性。

一是“台独”意识形态的驱动。陈水扁是“投机型台独分子”，主要把“台独”作
为选举的工具。而赖清德是“理念型台独分子”，从不掩饰自己的“台独”底色，
甚至以此为傲。蔡英文执政时期，对“台独”只做不说，加速推进以“文化台独”
为代表的“柔性台独”。但赖清德将来有可能既做又说，不但实质推进，而且公开
叫嚣“台独神话”，甚至有可能炮制李登辉的“特殊两国论”或陈水扁的“一边一
国论”。

二是深绿势力的裹挟。赖清德被称为“台独金孙”，岛内深绿势力对他充满了无限
期望，认为赖清德可以在“台独”道路上迈出更大的步伐。如果赖清德的“台独”
政策扭扭捏捏、遮遮掩掩、不够激进，深绿势力势必会向赖清德发起猛烈反扑，迫
使其踏上冒进“台独”的不归路。

三是“跛脚”执政的现实需要。赖清德虽然胜选，但只是“惨胜”，仅有40%左右的
得票，其余60%的投票者对赖都是投下不信任票。更重要的是，民进党已经失去对台
湾“立法院”的掌控权。这意味着，赖清德还未上台，已经提前“跛脚”。在对外
活动空间方面，赖清德也将困难重重。赖清德刚一胜选，瑙鲁就宣布与台“断交”。
岛内舆论多认为，这是对赖清德的当头一棒。在内外交困情势下，赖清德可能会主
动向绿营基本盘逢迎示好，进行“台独”作秀，巩固住基本盘，防止民意支持度崩
盘。

赖清德激进“台独”路线面临内外交困

从其内心深处，赖清德想复制李登辉和陈水扁时期的“台独”老路，但岛内社情民
意与两岸关系的时空语境已发生根本性变化，这也为赖清德戴上一道“紧箍咒”，
使其无法恣意妄为。陈水扁都坦承，“台独”做不到就是做不到。陈水扁做不到的
事情，赖清德也难以完全实现。

第一，台湾主流民意强烈反对。目前，岛内民众都希望要和平，不要战争；要发展，
不要动荡；要过好日子，不要过苦日子；希望两岸交流，而非交恶；希望两岸对话，
而非对抗。如果赖清德大搞“台独”，势必导致台海地区风高浪急，这必然会引发
岛内民众强烈反弹。

第二，美国担心被拖下水。2024年，全球动荡不安，俄乌冲突尚未结束，中东战火
又重新燃起。在此情势下，美国不希望台海地区成为新的闪爆点，否则美国将分身
乏术，疲于应对。美国高度忧心赖清德会成为陈水扁一样的“麻烦制造者”，因而
在赖胜选的第一时间，美国总统拜登就公开表态美国不支持“台独”，美国国务院
也表态会遵守一个中国政策，这无疑等于给赖清德敲下警钟。

第三，中国大陆的坚决反对。相较于李登辉时期，目前两岸实力对比发生了翻天覆
地的变化。中国大陆有更坚定的意志和更强大的能力坚决挫败“台独”分裂行径。
如果赖清德胆敢冲撞中国大陆的底线，最后势必撞得粉身碎骨。

赖清德两岸路线的可能走向

赖清德既想落实“台独”，但又面临内外多重压力，未来有可能玩弄走钢丝游戏，
在多方压力下寻求平衡路线。

其一，拒不接受“九二共识”。赖清德长期抹黑诋毁“九二共识”，更不认同两岸
同属一个中国。蔡英文在上台之初，还曾经表态承认“九二会谈”的历史事实，未
来赖清德将比蔡英文更加保守倒退，连“九二会谈”的历史事实都不愿意承认。

其二，拒不放弃“台独党纲”。“台独党纲”一直是民进党最大的罩门，民进党内
部一直有人呼吁应该早日冻结“台独党纲”。与此同时，“台独党纲”也给台海和
平埋下极大隐患，因而直到2024年台湾地区领导人选举前，美国还有不少学者专门
撰文，要求民进党冻结“台独党纲”。虽然内外皆有呼声，但赖清德会视而不见、
听而不闻，冻结“台独党纲”的可能性微乎其微。

其三，回归“台湾前途决议文”。1999年，民进党通过所谓“台湾前途决议文”，
此后成为民进党死守不放的“神主牌”。2023年，赖清德及其竞选办公室总督导卓
荣泰等多次鼓吹“台湾前途决议文”的价值。未来赖清德也将以“台湾前途决议文”
为圭臬，来处理两岸政策。

结语

目前，台湾正徘徊在战争与和平的十字路口，被视为“全球最危险的地方”，未来
的更大变数，就是赖清德的两岸政策。如果赖清德摆出一副“我已当选，你奈我何”
的摆烂心态，甚至往激进“台独”方向冒进，台海地区或将兵凶战危；但如果赖能
及时调整相关政策，两岸关系或将迎来峰回路转。

在竞选期间，赖清德相关表态颇为激进，但胜选后，姿态明显调整，声称将“维持
现状”。赖清德离5月20日上台还有一段空窗期，在此期间，他应多方倾听民意，以
台湾2300万民众福祉为念，早日从根本上调整两岸政策，只有如此，才能给自己的
执政带来良好开局，也才能为台湾经济社会发展带来新的契机。