The Venezuela episode engineered by the Trump administration and the renewed 
talk of “acquiring” Greenland may appear to point in different directions-one 
targeting a neighboring country in the Western Hemisphere, the other focused 
on a strategic node in the Arctic and the North Atlantic. One involves an 
intrusion into another country's government, the other makes a political 
claim over territory and strategic assets.Yet when placed within the broader 
strategic context of Trump's second term, the two are better understood 
as twin expressions of the same underlying logic. The U.S. is scaling back 
its institutionalized commitments to global order, while increasingly favoring 
exclusive, coercive and highly visible means to shape outcomes in regions 
it defines as core security spaces.

For this reason, what some analysts frame as a debate over ǒstrategic retrenchmentō 
versus a ǒnew form of hegemonyō is not binary. The two can coexist. What 
is being rolled back is the stability of responsibility and credibility, 
while the will and capacity to control key spaces, corridors and assets 
is reinforced.

The symbolic significance of the Trump administration's action against Venezuela 
does not lie in whether it can reshape the country's political trajectory 
in the short term but in the way it bundles so-called cross-border law enforcement,
 military action and political transition into a single coercive package 
that creates faits accomplis. The signal is clear. Once Washington defines 
a country or an issue as an extension of U.S. homeland securityùor as transnational 
crime, migration control or regional stabilityùit is more inclined to resort 
to quick-impact coercive measures rather than to pursue long-term governance 
arrangements through multilateral consultation.Such an approach greatly increases 
the risk of political spillovers, forces neighboring countries to reassess 
the stability of sovereign boundaries and encourages more states to accelerate 
hedging strategies across realms of security, finance, supply chains and 
diplomacy. As a result, regional order becomes more prone to a vicious cycle 
of reacting to shocks, and then being hit by renewed shocks.

The Greenland issue pushes the same logic to the other end of the spectrum. 
What the Trump administration is pursuing is not a short-term operational 
objective but the contestation of strategic assets over the medium and long 
term. Straddling the North Atlantic and the Arctic, Greenland constitutes 
a critical node for U.S. early warning, missile defense and space surveillance 
systems. Against the backdrop of intensifying competition over critical 
minerals, its resource potential has also been incorporated into Washington's 
ǒsupply chain securityō narrative.More important, Donald Trump's rhetoric 
reflects a fundamental shift in America's conception of order. When it comes 
to the territorial and sovereign boundaries of allies, the U.S. no longer 
relies solely on consultation to address its concerns. Instead, it increasingly 
puts these issues within a transactional framework of security responsibilities,
 burden-sharing and rights acquisition, even using coercive language to 
raise the price.

For Europe, what is at stake is not the question of American power per se, 
but whether U.S. commitments remain credible. Once threats and transactions 
enter the internal agenda of alliances, concerns grow that existing boundaries 
of rules could be redrawn. The foundation of trust between the U.S. and 
Europe is eroded as a result, and the momentum behind Europe's pursuit of 
defense autonomy is once again strengthened.

Viewed together, Venezuela and Greenland reveal a more discernible strategic 
outline. The Trump administration's ǒretrenchmentō does not amount to a 
withdrawal from international affairs. Rather, it reflects the compression 
of long-term, costly and institutionalized global public goods provided 
by the United States. At the same time, in a limited number of spaces defined 
as directly linked to homeland security and strategic depth, Washington 
has shown a greater willingness to employ heavy-handed, more exclusive and 
even more coercive instruments to secure control.This amounts to a form of 
ǒselective hegemony.ō It no longer draws its primary legitimacy from universal 
rules and stable commitments but derives from controllability under the 
banner of national security and cost-benefit calculations. In this configuration,
 the U.S. prefers to project power in self-defined core areas rather than 
to act as a global custodian of order.

If one asks whether this represents strategic retrenchment or a new form 
of hegemony, a plausible answer may be that the U.S. is undergoing a remake 
of the way hegemony is exercised. The traditional model emphasized reducing 
uncertainty through alliance networks, multilateral mechanisms and rule-making; 
the current model places greater emphasis on enhancing control through tariffs,
 sanctions, law enforcement, limited military deterrence and issue-based 
transactions. What is being reduced is institutional patience. What is being 
increased is the hardness of instruments. What is being scaled back is long-term 
external commitment. What is being strengthened is exclusive leverage over 
key nodes.

Is this shift short-term or long-term? It clearly bears the imprint of Trump'
s highly personalized approach, making U.S. policy more impulsive and less 
predictable in the short run. Structurally, however, it is not merely a 
matter of individual preference. It is driven by domestic political polarization,
 fiscal constraints, declining public tolerance for overseas commitments, 
multi-front strategic competition and growing anxieties over industrial 
and technological security.A change of administration may alter the rhetoric 
and packaging, but it is unlikely to reverse the broader direction toward 
more conditional commitments, more instrumental rules and greater emphasis 
on core interests. The U.S. is unlikely to return to an era in which it 
was willing to continuously underwrite global order. It is more likely to 
become accustomed to acting first and negotiating later in key domains, using 
action to set the agenda and leverage to extract burden-sharing.

For regional and international order, this posture of retrenchment combined 
with coercion will have three major consequences:First, the securitization 
of the regional order will deepen; Latin American countries will become 
more sensitive to external intervention and sovereignty risks; Europe will 
grow more concerned about the transactional nature of alliance rules; and 
the Arctic will move more rapidly from a zone of cooperation to one of competition.
Second, the declining stability and predictability of rules will accelerate 
hedging behavior. More countries will prepare multiple options across supply 
chains, financial settlement systems, critical infrastructure and diplomatic 
partnerships, further fragmenting the global system and making stable consensus 
harder to sustain.Third, major-power competition will become more fierce. 
When countries underestimate the costs of coercive action, the risks of 
miscalculation increase and the space for crisis management is squeezed.

All this means that in the period ahead, the central challenge for the international 
community is not whether the U.S. will withdraw from regional and global 
affairs but how it will participate in them. The U.S. remains powerful, 
but the way it provides order is changing. The key is not to judge whether 
America is retreating or expanding but to understand how this new model 
operates. In which spaces will Washington act more forcefully? Which issues 
are most likely to be securitized? In which domains will rules become weapons? 
Only by answering these questions can risk management be pursued in a more 
systematic and long-term manner in an environment where competition and cooperation 
coexist.

Venezuela and Greenland are not two separate stories but a single thread. 
A more transactional, more emotional and more coercion-oriented U.S. is 
taking shape, and the world must learn to identify new sources of stability 
in the context of this transformation.

    
  从委内瑞拉到格陵兰岛：
美国的战略收缩还是新型霸权？

  孙成昊（Sun Chenghao）
(清华大学战略与安全研究中心副研究员、2025年慕尼黑青年领袖) 
  

特朗普政府制造的委内瑞拉事件与格陵兰岛“获取论”看似分属两个方向，一个发
生在西半球近邻，一个指向北极和北大西洋战略节点，一个是对他国政府的侵犯，
一个是对领土与战略资产的政治性主张，但若把二者置于特朗普第二任期整体战略
语境之下，它们则更像同一套逻辑的两个案例。

美国在收缩对全球秩序制度性投入的同时，却在其界定为“核心安全”的区域更倾
向于以排他、强制、可见的方式塑造结果。也正因此，一些分析人士讨论的美国到
底是在“战略收缩”还是在建立“新型霸权”并非截然矛盾，而是可以同时成立。
美国收缩的，是责任承诺和国际义务，而强化的，是对关键空间、通道与资产的控
制意志和手段。

特朗普政府委内瑞拉行动的标志性意义，并不在于是否能在短期内改变一个国家的
政治走向，而在于把所谓“跨境执法”“军事行动”“政治过渡”等手段捆绑在一
起，制造既成事实。其信号十分清晰：当美国把某个国家或议题界定为本土安全、
跨国犯罪、移民与地区稳定的延伸，它就更愿意诉诸立竿见影的强制手段，而不是
通过多边协商塑造长期治理安排。这种做法大大增加了地区政治的外溢风险，迫使
周边国家重新评估主权边界的稳定性，也会推动更多国家在安全、金融、供应链与
外交领域加速对冲，地区秩序由此更容易进入一种面对冲击做出应激反应、之后再
次遭遇冲击并反应的恶性循环。

格陵兰岛议题则把同一套逻辑推向另一端。特朗普政府瞄准的并非短期目标，而是
在中长期争夺战略资产。格陵兰岛横跨北大西洋与北极方向，是美国预警、反导与
太空监视体系的重要支点。在各国对关键矿产竞争加剧的背景下，其资源潜力也被
纳入美国“供应链安全”叙事。更重要的是，特朗普式表态背后体现出美国秩序观
的根本变化，那就是，针对盟友领土与主权边界，美国不再仅仅通过协商来处理关
切，而是倾向于将其纳入安全责任、成本分摊、权利获取的交易框架，甚至以强制
性语言抬高要价。

对欧洲而言，它触及的不是美国实力强弱与否，而是美国的承诺是否仍然可信。当
威胁和交易双双进入同盟内部议程，欧洲日益担心规则边界被重写，美欧之间的信
任基础因此遭到侵蚀，欧洲追求防务自主的动力再次增强。

把委内瑞拉与格陵兰岛放在一起看，就可以看到一个更清晰的轮廓。特朗普政府的
“收缩”不是退出国际事务，而是压缩长期、昂贵、制度化的全球公共产品供给。
与此同时，在少数被界定为直接关联本土安全与战略纵深的空间，特朗普政府反而
愿意动用更强硬、更排他甚至更具胁迫性的手段，以确保控制力。这种“选择性霸
权”，不再以普遍主义规则和稳定承诺为主要合法性来源，而是受国家安全名义下
的可控性与成本收益核算驱动。在这种情况下，美国更愿在自己定义的核心地带展
示权力，而不是在全球范围承担秩序维护者角色。

因此，若问这是“战略收缩”还是“新型霸权”，更准确的答案或许是，美国正在
进行一次“霸权方式重塑”。过去的美国霸权强调通过同盟网络、多边机制和规则
塑造来降低不确定性，现在的美国则更强调通过关税、制裁、执法、有限军事威慑
与议题化交易来提高控制力。美国减少的是制度耐心，增加的是手段硬度，收缩的
是对外部的长期承诺，强化的是针对关键节点的排他性能力。

这种变化是短期还是长期的？在风格上，这种政策变化显然带有特朗普高度个人化
的特征，短期内更冲动、更不可预测。但在结构层面，它又不完全取决于个人偏好，
而是美国国内政治极化、财政压力、社会对海外投入耐心下降、多线竞争和产业安
全焦共同推动的结果。美国政府换届可能改变措辞与包装，却未必改变更条件化的
承诺、更工具化的规则、更强调核心利益的大方向。美国未必会回到那个愿意为全
球秩序持续付出的时代，却可能越来越习惯于在关键领域先出手、再谈判，以行动
制造议程，以强势换取成本分摊。

对地区与国际秩序而言，这种收缩与强制并存的美国政策调整将带来三重后果。一
是地区秩序安全化将进一步加深。拉美国家会对外部干预与主权风险更敏感，欧洲
会更担心同盟内部规则遭到交易，北极方向会更快从合作议题转向竞争议题。二是
规则的稳定性和可预期性下降将推动各国加速对冲。更多国家会在供应链、金融结
算、关键基础设施与外交伙伴上做多手准备，全球体系因此更碎片化，也更难形成
稳定共识。三是大国竞争烈度加剧。当各国低估强制行动的成本，误判风险将随之
上升，危机管理空间也将受到挤压。

这也意味着，未来一段时间国际社会面临的难题并非“美国是否退出地区和国际事
务”，而是“美国将如何参与地区和国际事务”。美国仍然强大，但其提供秩序的
方式正在变化。关键不在于评价美国是收缩还是扩张，而在于识别这种新模式的运
行机制：在哪些空间美国会更强势，哪些议题更可能被安全化，哪些领域规则会被
工具化，在竞争与合作并存的环境里如何把风险管控得更系统、更长期。

委内瑞拉与格陵兰岛并非两个故事，而是一条线索。一个更交易化、更情绪化、更
偏向强制手段的美国正在成形，而世界必须学会在美国之变的背景下确定新的稳定
之源。 

(The source of the article comes from  chinausfocus.com)